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ABSTRACT 
 
While theoretically important, the relationship between crime and employment is 
difficult to measure empirically. This paper addresses major identification challenges 
by exploiting high frequency data of daily online postings on job openings and 
closings at the county level, merged with individual-level administrative data about all 
inmates released from French prisons. We find that people who are released when jobs 
are being created are less likely to recidivate; conversely, people who are released 
when jobs are being cut are more likely to recidivate. We further show that news on 
job creation matters, over and beyond actual employment opportunities, suggesting 
implications for crime-control policies. From a methodological standpoint, this paper 
demonstrates how using media and online information on jobs can generate higher-
frequency variation than administrative employment data, and help to overcome 
identification challenges to capture effects of variations in job market opportunities, 
especially when combined with other administrative sources.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the United States, incarceration rates today are seven times higher than in the 
seventies (Levitt, 2004) and twice as high in European countries (Buonanno et al. 
2011). A less discussed side effect has been the increase in the number of people 
released from prison. While the growth in prison population is associated with some 
reduction in crime rates (Levitt, 1996; Raphael and Stoll, 2013), many people who 
have been incarcerated reoffend: 67.5% of ex-prisoners released in 1994 in the United 
States had been re-arrested for a new offense three years later (Langan and Levin, 
2002). Recidivism in itself poses important problems: many people cycle through the 
criminal justice system, and understanding how to reduce re-offending is in itself an 
important policy challenge.  
 
One important theoretical determinant of crime is labor markets. Former inmates may 
be cycling in and out of prison because they have a hard time finding jobs or because 
they do not respond to incentives created by legitimate earnings opportunities: they 
might be screened out by employers in legal labor markets, or lack information on 
suitable jobs. In the second case, improving former inmates’ chances to access 
legitimate jobs would be ineffective in reducing recidivism, while in the first case an 
increase in the probability of accessing legitimate jobs should decrease former 
inmates’ propensity to reoffend. Understanding how former inmates respond to factors 
that might affect their probability of finding jobs or getting better legitimate earnings 
could be crucial to design effective crime control policies. From both a theoretical and 
a policy perspective, it is important to understand the marginal effectiveness of 
increasing the severity of sanctions, relative to increasing former inmates’ probability 
of finding jobs – the two main determinants of crime in Becker’s seminal model. To 
answer this question, we need clean evidence about former inmates’ responses to 
variation in the relevant labor markets conditions. 
 
This paper focuses on an important and quite unexplored determinant of likelihood of 
finding a job: how information about local labor market conditions affects re-offending 
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upon release from prison. The interaction between labor markets and crime has been 
modeled theoretically, but relatively rarely investigated empirically. The empirical 
literature on recidivism after prison has mainly focused on the effect of penal policies, 
such as sentence length (Kuziemko, 2013; Drago, Galbiati and Vertova 2009), 
alternative to incarceration (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013), detention conditions 
(Chen and Shapiro, 2007; Drago, et al., 2011), or encounters in prison (Bayer et 
al., 2009 ; Drago and Galbiati, 2012; Ouss, 2011). Overall, these results indicate that 
former inmates respond to changes in the environment, but it is far from obvious that 
former inmates would also respond to variation in local labor market conditions, real 
or perceived. The standard economic model of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968; 
Ehrlich, 1973) implies that after release from prison, former inmates should decrease 
criminal activities when they face an increase in job availability: when more jobs are 
available, all else equal, the opportunity cost of time spent both in criminal activity 
and in prison if apprehended and convicted rises.2 However, for this prediction to hold, 
former inmates would have to respond to variations in incentives created by changing 
labor market conditions. Although intuitive, this is not obvious since people entering 
prison tend to not have been employed in the formal sector (Western and Pettit, 2005; 
Loeffler, 2013), and thus they may not be responsive to this margin. This could also be 
the case if they lack relevant human capital or information about job availability, if 
they are somehow barred from the formal job market, or if experiences in prison have 
otherwise overwhelmingly increased returns to crime.    
 
Understanding whether and how former inmates respond to variations in labor market 
conditions is empirically very challenging. Identification is hampered by a number of 
confounding factors correlated with both labor markets and offending. People with 
better jobs might elect to move out of higher crime areas, leading to a non-causal 
correlation between crime and lower job availability. In this paper we address this 
major identification challenge by using very granular data on releases from prison and 
on job creations and cuts. We build a novel dataset by combining administrative data 
                                                        
2
 Job-search models of labor markets and crime also predict, from another angle, that more job 
opportunities for individuals just released from prison would reduce recidivism (Engelhardt, 2010). 
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on all inmates released from France in 2009-2010 and high-frequency information on 
media coverage of job flows, which we obtain at the daily-county level. For each 
former French inmate, we construct an index reporting the number of news stories and 
classified advertisements on job openings and cuts in their county of residence in the 
thirty days following their release from prison. Our identification strategy exploits 
within county, daily variations in the flow of information about job openings and 
destructions. The high frequency of our data coupled with spatial variation allows us 
to control both for fixed and time-dependent unobserved heterogeneity. We exploit 
random variations in daily announcements and in exact timing of release from prison 
to identify the effects of news about job flows on recidivism.  
 
Our results are consistent with predictions from the standard economic model of 
crime. We find that an increase in the number of announcements on job openings in 
their county of residence in the month following an inmate’s release from prison 
decreases the probability of reoffending (a one standard deviation increase in stories 
on job openings induces a 10% reduction in the probability of a new incarceration 
within six months), while an increase in the number of announcements on job cuts 
increases the probability of re-offending. Such an effect holds across types of crime 
and socio-economic backgrounds of former inmates. The effect of an increase in 
announcements on job openings may be due to a variety of reasons. Digging into 
mechanisms, we look at the effect of media coverage of newly created jobs (beyond 
new vacancies) on recidivism. Exploiting the timing of announcements and job start 
dates, we show that the main driver of our results is the information channel. This 
suggests that providing information about job availability to former inmates could be 
an effective and low-cost way to help reduce recidivism.  
 
Our exercise is the first documenting the impact of news on jobs on reoffending. We 
introduce two main innovations with respect of the existing literature. First we use a 
novel identification strategy based on the fine granularity of our data, exploiting daily, 
individual-level variations. Second, we are able to provide policy recommendations 
that could be effective in reducing crime at a relatively low cost. Moreover, our study 
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shows how alternative sources of information about job flows (i.e., media coverage 
and classified advertisements) can be useful to grasp some of the mechanisms 
underlying individual responses to job market conditions by generating more granular 
job market indicators. In the same vein, recent work has used data from 
Careerbuilder.com to look at worker mobility (Marinescu and Rathelot, 2014) and 
general equilibrium effects of increased unemployment benefits (Marinescu, 2014). 
Using online job postings as a finer-grained proxy for unemployment could have 
applications to many topics in labor studies, both to improve identification, and to 
capture the exact timing of events. Moreover, this paper demonstrates the usefulness 
of complementing administrative data with either publicly available newspaper content 
data, or more generally, data exhaust generated online. In that way, our paper also 
suggests ways to expand the literature on the effects of media content and diffusion on 
offending (Dahl and Della Vigna, 2009; Bhuller et al., 2013).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a conceptual framework and discusses 
related literature; Section 3 presents institutions and data; Section 4 exposes our empirical 
strategy and main results, which are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Jobs and Recidivism: Conceptual Framework  
 
Consistent with the standard economic approach to crime (Becker, 1968), we assume 
that after release from prison an individual decides on offending by comparing the 
relative utility of time spent working or in other activities, relative to the utility derived 
from committing crimes, net of the costs of incarceration weighted by probability of 
apprehension. We focus on the job search activity, from which standard models 
usually abstracts. 
 
We assume that people have beliefs about their likelihood to find a job upon release 
from prison. In the absence of additional information, they would make the decision to 
commit a crime based on their beliefs of their likelihood of finding a job: the higher 
(lower) the prospects of finding a job, the lower (higher) the likelihood that they would 
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reoffend, due to the increase (decrease) in opportunity costs of crime. But beliefs could 
be shifted by additional information about the labor market, which could be obtained 
from media coverage of local employment and classified advertisements. 
 
For ease of exposition, we assume that individuals are unemployed when released, and 
that they immediately start to look for a job. At any moment, an individual might 
receive a job offer, the probability of which increases with search effort, which in turn 
depends on the costs of searching. An individual can work, offend, or search for a job, 
which for simplicity’s sake are assumed to be mutually exclusive. An individual would 
decide to commit a crime if the expected utility from criminal activity (net of the 
disutility of incarceration if apprehended) is higher than the expected utility of 
continuing the job search, which in turn depends on the probability of finding a job. 
After receiving a job offer, a person then could decide whether to accept it; refuse and 
continue search activity; or refuse and offend. If they accept the job offer, they no 
longer offend; if they refuse, while in an environment where the probability of 
receiving a better offer is high enough, they will keep on searching; and if the 
probability of receiving a better offer is too low, they will stop searching and may 
engage in crime. In any case, the offending decision at a given point in time depends 
on the expected probability of finding a job.  
 
There could be two channels through which news on jobs could affect recidivism of 
people release from prison. All else equal, if news about newly available jobs is a good 
indicator of new job vacancies, an increase in news should reflect tighter job market 
conditions and thus a higher probability of finding jobs.3 More jobs might result in 
greater likelihood to find a job, and therefore directly change the opportunity cost of 
crime. When former inmates find jobs more easily, their opportunity cost of 
reoffending should increase. This is what we label as the direct effect of job openings. 
News could also provide information about jobs, conditional on their availability. 
Information could help former inmates update their prior assumptions about the 
                                                        
3
 Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2004) also document that employers are more likely to hire people with 
felony records – and thus, plausibly, former inmates – in better economic conditions. 
 LIEPP Working Paper n°41 
 
7 
 
probability of finding a job. We label this the information channel. 
 
If news about jobs positively impacts individual beliefs about the probability of 
finding a job, an increase in news about job openings should be associated with a 
decrease in reoffending. Information about the existence of particular jobs also lowers 
search costs: former inmates can target their search effort to firms with vacancies. 
Note that this second channel works by reducing offending even keeping constant the 
number of actual jobs available: by decreasing search costs, news would affect the 
propensity to reoffend either if searching for a job prevents individuals from crime 
(through incapacitation), or if higher search efforts increase likelihood of actually 
finding a job, keeping all else constant.  
 
In our empirical analysis, we assume that the relevant job market for a newly released 
individual is the job market in his county of residence upon entering prison.4  We first 
document that news about job openings correlates with official measures of new job 
vacancies, and that this correlation is stronger for sectors where former inmates are 
more likely to potentially be employed, such as construction (Schnepel, 2013). We 
then document that keeping all else equal, an increase in news about job openings in 
the county of residence is associated with less recidivism (the opposite holds for news 
about job cuts). This is consistent with the idea that an increase in job market tightness 
should reduce reoffending by increasing former inmates’ employment (the opposite 
holds for job cuts, which map into an increase in unemployment). We then explore 
whether this is mostly driven by the direct effect of new available jobs or if 
information itself plays a role in reducing offending, and find the latter to hold.  
 
More specifically, we study whether news still affects recidivism after controlling for 
measures of job market tightness, computed from official labor market statistics. We 
find that publicity about jobs matters, beyond job availability. We then exploit the 
timing of the job announcements and their content to disentangle the effect of 
                                                        
4
 Among people who recidivated, 89% listed the same county as their place of residence for both 
incarceration spells. In additional analyses, we also look at jobs in the county where the prison of 
release is located, when it differs from the county of residence. 
2015/11 
 
8 
 
available jobs (the first channel), from the effect of information about existing jobs 
(the second channel). If conditional on available jobs information plays a role in 
reducing offending, this suggests that, in order to reduce offending, effective policies 
should aim not only to encourage the creation of new jobs but also, all else equal, to 
provide information about job availability to former inmates. Finally, we provide 
evidence about the differential effect of news about jobs according to broadband 
Internet availability. The idea is that conditional on existing newly available jobs, 
broadband Internet facilitates the collection of information on these available jobs. 
 
Prior studies have looked at the aggregate relation between labor market conditions 
and crime. This literature has tried to document the robustness of the theoretical 
prediction of a positive relation between unemployment and crime. The evidence 
provided by these studies is mixed: most studies find little effect for property crimes 
and mixed evidence for violent crime rates when using OLS regressions (Raphael and 
Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Oster and Agell, 2007; Lin, 2008; 
Buonanno et al. 2011). Instrumental variables estimates find an increase in property 
crimes with higher unemployment (Gould et al., 2002; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 
2001; Oster and Agell, 2007; Fougere, et al., 2009), confirming the relevance of 
confounding factors when looking at aggregate data. Even if these results are 
consistent with the standard model of crime, it is hard to conclude that policies aimed 
at reducing unemployment should have a large impact on reducing reoffending. 
Indeed, it is difficult to infer the behavior of former inmates by observing aggregate 
responses of crime rates to unemployment since such an exercise would require a 
number of restrictive behavioral and statistical hypotheses (Durlauf et al., 2010).  
 
Only a few papers have focused on the effect of labor market conditions on offending 
behavior. Summer jobs for at-risk youth have been shown to reduce violence and 
victimization (Heller, 2014; Gelber, Isen, and Kessler, 2015), and targeted job 
opportunities for former inmates reduce recidivism (Redcross et. al., 2011). However, 
we know very little about whether and how these findings carry over to a broader 
population of adults, moreover to those who are more involved in the criminal justice 
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system. Only a couple of papers have tried to determine the relation between job 
market opportunities and recidivism for adults. Schnepel (2013) uses data on parolees 
released from prison in California and examines the effects of variations in local 
unemployment rates among unskilled individuals, finding that an increase in relevant 
industries’ unskilled unemployment is associated with higher recidivism. Also looking 
at parolees from California, Raphael and Weiman (2007) find moderate effects of 
county unemployment rates on the likelihood that paroled offenders return to custody.  
 
As opposed to these papers, we study the entire universe of all former French inmates 
and not only parolees, who are in general selected for good behavior or other positive 
qualities and may be among the sub-categories of inmates most responsive to 
incentives. Moreover, our identification strategy includes variations in job flows: 
while studies on crime and the labor market use unemployment levels, we can look at 
the effect of both job openings and cuts. Our identification strategy exploits within 
county variations in job openings at the daily level, thus overcoming the major 
identification challenges without needing an instrumental variable design. Finally, we 
are able to provide evidence on the effect of information about job availability 
conditional on the existing jobs. This last piece of evidence allows us to document the 
potential power of low-cost interventions that would provide information on job 
opportunities just before a person is released from prison. 
 
2. Institutions and Data 
 
2.1. Incarceration in France 
 
As of January 2013, there were 66,572 inmates in France, which has an incarceration 
rate of about 110/100,000.5 This incarceration rates is orders of magnitude smaller than 
that of the US (910/100,000 in 2014, Glaze and Kazble, 2014), but around the median of 
European incarceration rates. Sentences in France tend to be very short: the average time 
                                                        
5
 Statistics on French and European incarceration can be found at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/Chiffres_cles_2013_opt.pdf  
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spent in prison is 8.9 months. Thirty-six percent of sentences are shorter than one year 
and 66% are shorter than three years. A corollary of that is that there is a high turnover 
rate in French prisons, and there were 87,958 releases in 2012. Fifty-one percent of 
inmates released had spent less than six months in prison and 91% had spent less than 
one year in custody.  Most people released from prison in France are therefore overall 
similar, in terms of length of incarceration, to people released from jails in the US.   
 
Relevant to our study of jobs and recidivism, criminal background checks are 
generally illegal in France for employment purposes. Convicted people are barred 
from fewer professions than in the US, but are barred from nearly all public sector 
jobs, which represent roughly 20% of France’s labor force.6 Criminal records can also 
be checked for jobs where they might pose particular risks (e.g., law enforcement, 
working with children or the elderly, etc.). There are also no general rules barring 
people from living in certain places (such as public housing), and most former inmates 
can return to live where they were prior to incarceration.  
 
France has a centralized prison system. The French Department of Prisons 
Administration (DAP) runs all 190 facilities, both jails (for pretrial and short-term 
sentences) and prisons (for inmates with longer sentences). We obtained an 
administrative dataset on all inmates in French prisons in 2008 – 2010, and merged 
that with a dataset of online job announcements, both of which we now describe.  
 
2.2. Individual Incarceration Records 
 
Information on incarceration comes from administrative data. A penal file is created 
upon each inmate's incarceration in France, and updated throughout the incarceration 
period. The file contains penal and socio-demographic data, and is filled over time with 
information on transfers within and across prisons, disciplinary incidents, and sentence 
reductions. All of this data populates the National Inmate File and the Numeric File of 
                                                        
6
 The list of jobs for which one must have a clean criminal background can be found here: 
http://www.cidj.com/sites/default/files/liste_des_metiers_pouvant_donner_lieu_a_la_consultation_directe_du_b
2.pdf 
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Management of Inmates under Custody File,7 which are centralized under the direction 
of the Department of Prisons Administration. These files are mainly meant for internal 
accountability and security purposes, and they are used to count inmates in France. The 
French Department of Prisons Administration generously provided administrative data 
on all inmates incarcerated in France between 2009 and 2010. 
 
The data contains information on gender, date of birth, nationality, place of birth, place 
of residency, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, job status (all 
of which is reported by the inmates themselves, and reflects their situation upon 
incarceration), offenses leading to incarceration, length of sentence for each offense, 
date of trial, type of prison, date of release, and sentence reductions. Each individual 
can be tracked over time with a unique encrypted identifier.8 Our principal outcome of 
interest is recidivism. Recidivism is defined by the fact that a person reappears in the 
prison dataset after being released from prison.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on people released from prison in 2009 and 
2010, which is the time period for which we have both prison and labor market data. 
During this time, 127,810 people were released from prison, and the average stay in 
prison was 10 months. The most frequent offenses were theft and battery. Relevant for 
our study, 39% of people did not have a job when entering prison.  
 
2.3. Labor Market Data 
 
Our main labor market data comes from a compilation of job openings and cuts posted 
online. The data was collected for commercial purposes by a private firm, the 
Observatoire de l’Investissement. The dataset was compiled from about 4,000 Internet 
sources, in particular local newspapers (43%), national newspapers, and job 
announcement websites. While we used a pre-complied version of this online data, this 
information could also be collected directly by scraping job announcement websites 
                                                        
7
 Fichier National des Détenus, FND, and Gestion Informatisée des Détenus en Etablissement, GIDE. 
8
 These are unique identifiers, based on first name, last name, and date of birth. For confidentiality 
purposes, the encrypting was done at the Ministry of Justice. 
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and searching local and national newspapers.  
 
This data contains daily listings of coverage of openings of new production plants, 
increases in the number of perspective employees in existing ones, as well as classified 
job offers (simply, “positive news” or “positive announcement” hereafter) and coverage 
of plant closures or downsizing (hereafter, “negative news/announcement”).9 We use 
this dataset to create our main measures of local labor market conditions. For each 
county (départment) in France and each day, we build measures of job creations and 
cuts that appeared on any source listed in the dataset in the 30 days following that date. 
Our main labor market indicators, as reflected by the media, are the number of positive 
and negative announcements; and the number of jobs created and cut. For each inmate, 
we can match date of release to content of news on that date. We thus obtain a measure 
of job openings and cuts that occur in the county each former inmate lived in, for the 
first 30 days after their release from prison. We exclude news on public sector jobs, 
since as mentioned earlier former offenders are not allowed to hold civil servant 
positions.10 As detailed further, we also vary the 30-day window in robustness checks. 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of information about job 
creations and cuts. On average, people released from prison faced 3.3 positive 
announcements and 2.1 negative announcements in the first 30 days after release. It is 
worth noting that our main measure of employment captures large operations, such as 
plant openings or closures, and big hiring plans or firms downsizing. The average 
estimated number of job openings in the first 30 days, conditional on having at least 
one positive announcement, is 149; and the average number of jobs cut if there is at 
least one negative announcement is 152.  
 
How much do our measures of job opening / closing capture French labor market 
conditions as reflected in official statistics? Figure 1 shows the correlation between our 
measure of job openings and the official statistics reporting new vacancies appearing in 
                                                        
9
 Also for simplicity’s sake, we refer jointly to positive and negative stories and announcements as 
“news stories about jobs.” 
10
 Public sector only represents 2.2% of the 22,545 announcements. 
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a calendar month, collected by the French employment agency (DARES-Pole Emploi). 
The horizontal axis captures the number of official vacancies communicated to the 
French employment agency in a calendar month in a given county (département) in 
2010 by sector of activity, and the vertical axis shows our measure of jobs openings 
aggregated by county and calendar month.11 This figure shows that our measure of 
vacancies is positively correlated with vacancies recorded in official statistics; even 
though it does not catch all jobs opened or cut, it is a reliable proxy for relevant job 
market conditions. Interestingly, the correlation between our measure and official 
vacancies in the construction and industrial sectors are strongest, and these sectors 
have higher concentrations of low-skills jobs.12  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
Our identification strategy exploits the daily variation in news on job creation and cuts 
that we can capture with our high-frequency online job database. We look at the effect 
of labor market information in the month after release on recidivism, defining “month 
of release” as the 30 days following the date of release. We exploit daily variation in 
the number of news stories. It makes sense to focus on the period immediately 
following incarceration for two reasons. First, the first few weeks have been shown to 
be crucial in terms of successful transition out of prison.13 Second, access to news is 
limited in French penal facilities. There is no Internet connection and very limited 
access to newspapers.14  The main source of information is national TV channels, 
which likely do not have a lot of information about local labor market conditions. 
 
Our empirical strategy relies on the hypothesis that daily variations in local labor 
                                                        
11
 Official statistics are available only for 2010. 
12 The regression of the number of announcements about the official vacancies presents a very high R-
square for both the construction sector (0.62) and the industrial sector (0.58), a high one for the service 
sector (0.53), and a small one for agricultural sector (0.07). 
13
 In France, 34% of ex-offenders have been re-convicted within three years after trial. Among them, 
8% are re-convicted during the first month. 
14
 Newspapers are mainly available at the prison's library. Internet is forbidden except in some pilot 
jails and smartphones were not common in France in 2009/2010. 
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market conditions are orthogonal to individual and context characteristics upon release 
from prison. The exact day of release is somewhat random, since it depends on the 
precise timing of the trial, date of incarceration, and sentence reductions, all of which 
might vary for reasons plausibly orthogonal to local job market conditions and 
individual characteristics. After controlling for month and county fixed effects, we 
look at recidivism as a function of the amount of positive and negative news in the 
precise 30 days following release. Keeping all else constant, people will be released in 
times of varying amounts of good or bad news about jobs, for idiosyncratic reasons. 
We exploit this randomness in exact timing of release from prison and in news on 
jobs. This identification strategy avoids problems of aggregations that plague studies 
of crime that use unemployment rates. 
  
4.1. Balancing Tests and Graphical Evidence 
 
Our main identifying assumption is that timing and content of news are orthogonal to 
individual characteristics, both observable and unobservable, of people released from 
prison. To explore this hypothesis, we run balancing tests on observables. For each 
individual, we split the sample at the median of job openings (cuts) in the county of 
residence that appeared in the thirty days after their release. We look for differences in 
observable characteristics above and below the median. In table 3, we report the 
results of t-tests for differences in observables, over and below the median of job 
information. This provides a test of observables being balanced for individuals with 
respect to the number of news stories on job openings or cuts. Observables are 
remarkably similar, and differences that are statistically significantly different from 
zero have very small point estimates.  
 
Before presenting the formal regression model and our main results, we present in figure 
2 some suggestive graphical evidence that captures the idea of the main treatment 
effects. We plot recidivism rates up to six months after release from prison for two 
groups of people: those who were released with more good news (lighter line) or more 
bad news (darker line). “Good” and “bad” news are defined as a greater number of 
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stories on job creation (or cuts). Figure 2 shows that recidivism rates are lower for 
people released when there is more good news about jobs, and the gap grows over time. 
This preliminary evidence suggests that our measures capture relevant information with 
respect to offending decisions. People released in moments when there is more good 
news about jobs tend to reoffend less frequently. We now turn to regression analysis. 
 
4.2. Main Regression Analysis 
 
To estimate the effect of local labor market conditions on recidivism of French former 
inmates, we first estimate the following linear regression model: 
 
 	 			  
 	
 	
 	 
 
Where Yist is an indicator of recidivism within six months after release (for an 
individual i in a county s at time t),  t ( ) is a forward-looking variable: it 
captures volume of news on job creations (or cuts) in the month after release.  
controls for individual characteristics; and   and  	  are county and month fixed 
effects. As we stressed above, since we use daily variation in job creations and cuts, 
our identification hypothesis is that daily variation within county and month for these 
measures are not correlated with individual-level heterogeneity and other county-level 
confounding factors that may be correlated with labor market conditions. Since the 
exact date of release is as good as random given trial-specific timing, our identification 
hypothesis concerning individual-level confounding factors is plausible and it is 
supported by the balancing tests presented in the previous section. Moreover, in other 
specifications we also introduce a set of week time effects and county-specific time 
effects as well as county-specific linear time trends to take into account potential 
heterogeneity at the county level that is not absorbed by month fixed effects. 
 
Table 4 reports our main results. Column 1 presents the results omitting our main 
variable of interest and gives an idea of the correlation between observables and 
recidivism six months after release from prion. Gender, education, marriage and age 
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appear to be protective factors. Likewise, people released on parole recidivate less, as 
do people who had jobs before going to prison. In terms of offenses, people 
incarcerated for theft are most likely to recidivate. These results are in line with 
correlations found in the literature. Columns 2 and 3 include our main variable of 
interest: number of articles on job openings and closings in one’s county of residence, 
in the 30 days after release from prison. Announcements about job openings in the first 
thirty days after release have a negative and significant impact on the probability to 
reoffend within six months after release. News on job cuts have the opposite effect, 
increasing the probability of being re-incarcerated. Adding the full set of individual-
level observables does not change the magnitude of coefficients, confirming indirectly 
that our variables of interest are orthogonal with respect to individual observables. We 
find that a one standard deviation increase in the number of new stories on job 
openings is associated with a 10% reduction in the probability of re-arrest within six 
months. A one standard deviation increase in number of stories on job cuts implies a 
5% increase in the probability of re-arrest within six months. In other words, the effect 
is quite large: being exposed to 10 additional positive job postings is correlated with a 
one percentage point decrease in the likelihood of recidivism, which is similar to the 
effect of having had a job prior to incarceration.  
 
Results hold across crime categories and by nationality and age of former inmates. 
Columns 4 and 5 of table 4 report results by employment status before the most recent 
incarceration. Results remain similar regardless of what the prior employment status 
was. 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
 
We now provide some robustness checks. In particular, we investigate whether our 
results are sensitive to variations in the definition of our main variables of interest, to 
the way we control for time and space, and to various sample restrictions.  
 
As a first step, we vary our definition of job announcements. We vary time windows 
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for job creations, and we check if our results are affected by the inclusion of job 
creation in the public sector. Results are presented in the first three columns of table 5. 
In column 1, we measure the effect of job announcements including the public sector. 
In column 2, we measure the effect of job announcements within 15 days after release, 
while in column 3, we account for the news within two months of release. Results are 
similar to those obtained in the previous section: signs and orders of magnitude are 
close and coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
A further concern about the robustness of our results is that, although we use daily 
variations in the number of announcements of job openings and cuts, some factors 
varying within counties that could be correlated with the volume of the 
announcements may be omitted. To check the robustness of our results with respect to 
this possible concern, we focus on different model specifications, including various 
time controls. In column 4 of table 5, we add a week fixed effect to the main 
regression. Those fixed effects account for events at the national level that could be 
correlated with the variation in the volume of announcements at the moment of 
release. Column 5 adds county by month fixed effects. In these specifications we are 
left with within month and county variation in the volume of announcements, thus we 
exploit within county and month daily variation in our independent variables. Column 
6 allows for different time trends in each county, while column 7 adds county time 
trends plus county fixed effects. Those specifications account for time trends within 
counties, which could be related to an increase in the volume of news over time. 
Results are robust across these alternative specifications; the sign and magnitudes of 
effects are similar, and all are significant. 
 
Our results can be interpreted as the causal effect of variations in local labor market 
conditions at the moment of release from incarceration under the hypothesis that the 
day of release is orthogonal with respect to variations in job market conditions, which 
we have demonstrated to be plausible. There is, however, a concern that this might be 
driven by an increase in early releases under more favorable economic conditions. 
Judges may prefer to grant early release to people who are more likely to find a job, 
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which they might find to be more often the case when more jobs are available. Thus 
local labor market conditions may correlate with some characteristics of those released 
from incarceration because of the selection made by judges to grant parole. While the 
balancing tests on the individuals’ observables presented above tend to rule this 
hypothesis, we provide evidence that our results are not driven by people on parole. 
The first column of table 6 shows that probability of receiving parole is not correlated 
with job announcements. Column 2 includes controls for parole, and columns 3 and 4 
report results for parolees and simple releases. Results are of similar magnitude for 
people released on parole or not: differences in re-offending are not driven by 
differences in releasing policies. 
 
4.4. Heterogeneity 
 
In our main analyses, recidivism is defined simply as being sent back to prison. Yet 
the offenses for which one can be incarcerated – mainly property crimes, drugs, 
violence and driving under influence (DUI) – theoretically diverge in their relation to 
legal employment opportunities. Property crimes are directly revenue generating and 
could be viewed as a substitute for employment, or in other words have an economic 
motivation. On the other hand, if drug use is driven by addiction problems, legal job 
opportunities may have smaller effects on this criminal activity related to dependency. 
 
We document this distinction by measuring the effect of job announcements on 
different type of post-release crime, namely property crimes, drugs, violence and 
DUIs. The outcome variables in these regressions are equal to one if a former inmate 
reoffends for that specific type of crime. These categories are not mutually exclusive: 
a person could for example be convicted of theft after drug consumption, which would 
count as both property crime and drugs. Results are presented in table 7. The effect of 
job announcements on property crime is presented in column 1, on drugs in column 2, 
on DUIs in column 3 and on violence in column 4. Positive job announcements are 
always significant. However, the effect of news of job creation is significantly bigger 
for property crimes and significantly lower for drug-related offenses. Results for 
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negative job announcements are less clear, although drug offenses also appeared to be 
less affected. Taken together, these results are consistent with our previous hypothesis 
that information about job market opportunities has a bigger effect on crimes that have 
an economic motivation (such as property crime) than on crime related to addictions. 
 
5. Discussion: Jobs, matching and optimism 
 
In this section we investigate whether, beyond actual labor market conditions, 
information about job availability affects the probability of recommitting a crime. The 
intuition, developed in detail in section 3, is the following. Conditional on the 
available jobs, news could reduce search costs, or change beliefs on job opportunities. 
In other words, our main results may reflect both the direct effect of an increase in 
available jobs and an effect of an increase in information about available jobs 
conditional on their existence. Distinguishing between these two channels is relevant 
since they may have different policy implications. While the first channel would be 
difficult to manipulate cost-effectively, the second channel suggests that simple 
policies providing information about relevant job market opportunities to people 
released from prison might be effective crime reduction tools. In this section, we dig 
into these channels by providing different pieces of evidence. 
 
5.1. Timing of the news 
 
We explore whether media coverage of available jobs has an effect on individual 
propensity to re-offend, beyond the direct effect of job availability. We extend our 
previous analysis to parse out effects of the timing of announcement versus job start 
date. More specifically we focus on three kinds of different job announcements:  
1. News published before release about jobs that will be available after release. 
These types of announcements capture jobs opened after one’s release that can 
affect people's behavior through better job market conditions, but not through 
information since people could not access this online information while in 
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prison.15  
2. News published after release about jobs opened before release. This type of 
news should not affect behavior through better job market conditions nor 
through information about available jobs that could ease the matching process. 
However, this type of news could affect people's expectations and optimism. 
3. News published after release about jobs opened after release. This type of 
information could affect recidivism through all the mechanisms described in the 
conceptual framework (job opportunities, matching, optimism). 
 
Table 8 presents results with this distinction. In column 1, we report the effect of news 
published after release on jobs created after release and news published before release 
on jobs created after release. Both coefficients are negative but the former is the only 
one significant with point estimates more than four times bigger than the latter. If our 
main effect were driven by the direct effect of increased job availability, both variables 
should have had similar coefficients. Indeed both capture the creation of new jobs after 
release from prison. However the former variable captures the effect of providing 
information about existing jobs, beyond simply the availability of jobs. The difference 
in coefficients suggests that job announcements do not only affect recidivism through 
job market conditions; job creations are far more effective in reducing recidivism 
when there is information about newly created jobs.  
 
One potential concern may arise if announcements about jobs available after one’s 
release which are published before the release happened to be a bad proxy of actual 
jobs available after release.16 In order to address this concern more precisely, we regress 
official vacancies during month t on job announcements published in month t-1 relating 
                                                        
15
 Note that while cell phones may be smuggled into jails, our data is from 2010 when smartphones 
were not widely used in France. In 2008, only 12% of people used their smartphones to go on the 
Internet, compared to 40% of people in 2012. In the past few months, there have been several stories 
about Facebook usage in French prisons, mainly discussing the novelty of the presence of 
smartphones. So while some people might have had Internet access while in prison in 2010, this was 
plausibly a rare occurrence. Source: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ip1452 
16
 This is unlikely as more than 62% of the announcement are published before the effective job 
creation or cuts. Then, those announcements are counted as news about job available after one's 
release but published before release for certain offenders and after release for others.  
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to job created in month t. The coefficient is similar in magnitude to the one obtained by 
regressing announcements in month t concerning job open in month t.17  
 
Column 2 of table 8 presents the effect of news published after release for jobs created 
before release, and news published after release for jobs created after release. Only the 
latter is sizable and significant. Positive announcements for jobs created before release 
have no effect on recidivism, even though former inmates had access to this news. 
This result is more coherent with a matching story than an optimism story, since job 
announcements – even about past openings – are still good news. If job 
announcements induced an update on assumptions about the probability of finding a 
job, we would expect positive announcements published after release to affect 
behaviors even if the vacancies had already been filled. Results presented in columns 1 
and 2 are confirmed in column 3, where the three measures are used together. 
 
All in all, these results indicate that information about jobs plays a role beyond actual 
job creations, and this effect is plausibly driven more by increased knowledge about 
job opportunities than by increased optimism about job market conditions. 
 
5.2 Effects conditional on official labor market statistics 
 
Our second piece of evidence relies on documenting the effect of announcements 
about jobs creations controlling for underlying local job market conditions. The idea is 
the following: if the effects we document in section 4 simply come from better job 
market opportunities, controlling for official statistics on employment should drive the 
effect of job announcements to zero. If the effect is, at least partially, driven by 
matching or updating people's assumptions, the effect of job announcements should 
remain significant, even after controlling for number of jobs actually available.  
 
                                                        
17 When we regress announcements published in month t-1 about jobs created in month t on official 
vacancies at t, we obtain a coefficient of 0.74 (0.038 with month and county fixed effects). The same 
regression, but using announcements published at t about job created in month t, gives a coefficient of 
0.54 (0.056 with month and county fixed effects). 
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Two different measures are publicly available at the month and county level: 
unemployment rates and the number of new vacancies collected by the national 
employment agency (ANPE). The latter captures a flow, and is closer to our job 
announcement variable. Results are presented in table 9.  
Column 1 presents the effect of job announcements when we control for the number of 
vacancies recorded in official statistics by calendar month and region. Column 2 
presents the effect of job announcements when we control for job market tightness 
measures, aggregated at the calendar month and regional level. The effect of job 
announcements remains significant and sizable, and the magnitude is comparable to 
our main effect.  
 
One reason why the effect might still hold is because of differences in the timing of 
these measures. The official statistics are computed at the monthly level. For example, 
in our main specifications, people released on the 1st of May are assumed to face the 
same unemployment rates than those released the 31th of May, but a different one than 
people released the 30th of April. Our job announcement variable has a finer 
granularity, and it might be capturing these finer within-month variations of the job 
market conditions. We overcome the timing problem by focusing on people released 
the first week (column 4) of the month. For these people, official statistics and job 
announcement variables have roughly the same temporality. The timing of news about 
job openings overlaps more closely with the timing of official statistics. The effect 
remains significant and point estimates are similar to those presented in section 3. 
Taken together, these results suggest that announcements do not only affect recidivism 
through job market conditions: better coverage of job openings and closing in itself 
affects recidivism. 
 
5.3. Internet and the access to information 
 
We have shown that information diffusion seems to increase the effect of job market 
conditions. We further test this result by looking at variations in access to news, 
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exploiting differences in access to high-speed Internet.18 The exact introduction of 
high-speed Internet in France is not well documented, but county density does not 
appear to be correlated with access to high-speed Internet (map linked in footnote). 
 
Results are presented in table 10. Column 1 presents the main regression in the area 
where Internet access is the worst. Columns 2 and 3 present the same regression in 
places with moderate and high access to high-speed Internet. Results indicate that 
coefficients are smaller for the areas where high-speed Internet coverage is lower.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest that conditional on the underlying job market 
conditions, the diffusion of news about job openings and cuts, which reduces search 
costs, may play a role in affecting recidivism. This hypothesis is consistent with recent 
evidence showing that, all else equal, unemployed persons who look for jobs online are 
re-employed faster than people who do not search for jobs online (Kuhn and Mansur, 
2014): higher internet availability and more online job announcements for given job 
market conditions should increase job finding rates in the short run and in turn reduce 
short-term recidivism. 
 
5.4. Policy implications 
 
There are many potential public policy levers that could be used to reduce recidivism. 
How do job announcements contrast to other potential policies? To get an easily 
interpretable estimate, we look at the effect of getting any positive announcement: it 
corresponds to a 7% decrease in recidivism.19 We can contrast this to other estimates 
in the literature: one extra month in prison is associated with a 4% reduction in 
recidivism (Kuziemko, 2013); two additional weeks in prison plus one extra month on 
                                                        
18
 Data on ADSL coverage are taken from Tactis (2013): “Internet-less zones (Zones blanches) have 
and ADSL coverage less or equal than 2 mbps.”  
http://www.tactis.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ZonesBlanches2M_par_dpt_nb_communes.jpg  
19
 To calculate this easily interpretable estimate, we create a dummy = 1 if a person received any 
positive announcements in the 30 days flowing their release from prison, and regress recidivism on 
this dummy, including the same controls as in our main specifications. Receiving positive 
announcements is significantly correlated with recidivism outcomes.  
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probation is associated with 5% reduction in recidivism (Philippe, 2015); one extra 
month in expected future sentences is associated with a 1.3% reduction in recidivism 
(Drago et. al., 2009). Depending on estimates, it appears that providing information to 
people on jobs is about equivalent to spending two extra months in prison, or 
expecting five more months in prison if re-convicted.   
 
The effects are smaller than those of alternatives to incarceration such as electronic 
monitoring, which are associated with a 25% (Ouss, 2013) to 50% (Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2013) reduction in recidivism. Thus, avoiding incarceration altogether 
might be the most cost-effective way to reduce recidivism in some cases, but 
providing inmates information about available job opportunities at the time of their 
release from incarceration still appears to be very cost-effective policy. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper uses fine-grained data on job announcements matched with administrative 
data on releases from prison to identify the effect of local labor market conditions on 
recidivism. This data allows us to overcome the main identification challenges that 
have held back analyses on this important policy question by exploiting high-
frequency variations in local labor market conditions. We find that recidivism is less 
likely when there is more coverage of job openings, and more likely when there is 
more coverage job cuts: recidivism responds to local labor market conditions. Digging 
into mechanisms, we find that news on job openings seems to be driving these effects, 
over and beyond the direct effect of job availability. Using estimates from previous 
studies, we find that this effect is comparable in size to those of increasing 
incarceration spells by about two months. This suggests that providing inmates with 
information about job market opportunities at their release from incarceration can be a 
cost-effective policy to reduce recidivism. 
 
Our study also innovates by studying the effects of local labor market conditions on 
recidivism by examining the entire universe of former inmates in a given year in a 
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single country. The picture emerging from our analysis suggests that, consistent with 
the standard economic approach to the study of crime, former inmates respond to the 
incentives provided by variation in formal labor market opportunities. This confirms 
the role of incentives in the formal labor market, even though other research has 
shown the importance of informal employment for people when they are released from 
prison. Our contribution has both theoretical and policy implications. Our empirical 
findings broadly fit predictions of standard economic models linking crime to labor 
market opportunities. From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that policies 
targeted to reduce unemployment may have positive spillovers by reducing recidivism 
and highlights the role of information about job availability, over and beyond the 
effect of unemployment reduction – which is a harder policy lever to manipulate. 
 
Increasing job opportunities is costly, and focusing efforts on people released from 
prison or otherwise involved with criminal justice might be perceived as unfair, or 
potentially create some moral hazard problems. Our finding that information about 
jobs matters over and beyond actual job availability is much more tractable from a 
policy and implementation perspective: diffusing relevant job information is much less 
costly than increasing employment. The importance of information has been shown to 
play an important role in other contexts, such as investments in schooling (Jensen, 
2010 and Hoxby and Turner, 2015), risky sexual behaviors (Dupas, 2011), or 
retirement investments (Duflo and Saez, 2003). It is not a new finding that information 
would play an important role in labor markets (Stigler, 1962); some research places 
particular emphasis on its diffusion via social networks (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 
2004). Our findings show that improving matching through information could also 
have impacts on important outcomes like offending, which might matter in particular 
when assessing the costs and benefits of social policies.  
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Figure 1 Monthly correlation between positive announcements and official vacancies. 
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Figure 2: Percent returned to prison, by month since release from prison and content of 
articles: more news about job creations (lighter line) vs. more stories about job destructions 
(darker line). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on releases from French prison: 2009 and 2010 
  Count Percent / Mean 
Socio-demographics   
Women 5551 4% 
Born in France 101814 80% 
French 109803 86% 
Married 39407 31% 
Has children 53083 42% 
Has a job when incarcerated 78061 61% 
High school 12922 10% 
Middle school 48465 38% 
Technical education 40413 32% 
No school 11523 9% 
Age upon release   32,3 
Offending   
Theft 44412 36% 
Drugs 26917 22% 
DUI 34612 28% 
Assault 43312 35% 
Parole 9312 7% 
Short-term prison 86064 67% 
Recidivated within 6 months 6307 5% 
Incarceration length   10,6 
Total 127,810   
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on job creations and destructions as presented in the 
Observatoire de l’Investissement data. 
 
  Mean Sd Min Max 
Positive announcements 30 days 3,32 3,98 0 48 
Negative announcements, 30 days 2,07 2,38 0 22 
Jobs created if at least one positive 
announcement, 30 days 149 337 2 8565 
Jobs destroyed if at least one negative 
announcement, 30 days 152 330 1 6736 
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Table 3: Balancing tests.  
  Positive announcements Negative announcements 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Difference 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Difference 
Women 0.043 0.043 0.000047 0.043 0.044 -0.0013 
Born in France 0.80 0.80 -0.0037 0.79 0.80 -0.0088*** 
French 0.86 0.86 -0.0028 0.85 0.86 -0.0091*** 
Married 0.30 0.31 -0.0084** 0.31 0.31 0.0028 
Has children 0.41 0.42 -0.0053 0.42 0.42 0.0018 
Job when incarcerated 0.61 0.60 0.0050 0.60 0.61 -0.0078* 
High school 0.10 0.10 0.000025 0.10 0.10 0.00039 
Middle school 0.38 0.38 0.0031 0.37 0.38 -0.0031 
Technical education 0.32 0.32 0.0015 0.32 0.32 -0.0041 
No school 0.090 0.092 -0.0016 0.094 0.090 0.0033 
Age upon release 32.3 32.3 -0.041 32.2 32.4 -0.20** 
Theft 0.36 0.36 -0.0058 0.36 0.36 0.0049 
Drugs 0.21 0.22 -0.0034 0.21 0.22 -0.0037 
DUI 0.28 0.28 0.00047 0.27 0.28 -0.0043 
Assault 0.35 0.35 -0.0086** 0.35 0.35 -0.0024 
Parole 0.072 0.073 -0.0013 0.071 0.072 -0.0010 
Short-term prison 0.67 0.66 0.014*** 0.68 0.67 0.017*** 
Incarceration length (days) 215.9 223.8 -7.85*** 218.0 221.8 -3.73 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***  p<0.001 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 (4 and 5) report summary statistics for the sample divided in evenly sized groups as 
follows. Within each county, we calculate the median number of positive (negative) announcements. Column 1 
(4) reports summary statistics for those inmates who are released when the number of positive (negative) 
announcements is below the median for their county, and col. 2 (5) reports summary statistics for inmates who 
are released when the number of positive (negative) announcements is above the median for their county. 
Column 3 (6) reports the point estimates of the differences between the means in cols. 2 and 3 (4 and 5).  
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Table 4: Job announcements and recidivism within 6 months: regression analysis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
social and 
penal 
indicators 
Number of 
announcements 
Number of 
announcements 
formerly 
unemployed 
formerly 
employed 
            
Positive announcements -0.00133*** -0.00134*** -0.00153*** -0.00115*** 
(0.000165) (0.000203) (0.000279) (0.000223) 
Negative announcements 0.000809*** 0.000912*** 0.000729* 0.00101*** 
(0.000304) (0.000297) (0.000413) (0.000325) 
Short-term prison -0.000557 -0.000843 -0.00210 -0.000445 
(0.00228) (0.00225) (0.00393) (0.00212) 
Parole -0.0162*** -0.0162*** -0.0136*** -0.0174*** 
(0.00228) (0.00227) (0.00438) (0.00271) 
Woman -0.0199*** -0.0199*** -0.0213*** -0.0163*** 
(0.00289) (0.00290) (0.00361) (0.00345) 
Born in France -0.00100 -0.000989 1.52e-05 -0.00169 
(0.00266) (0.00267) (0.00488) (0.00305) 
French 0.00613** 0.00624** 0.00977* 0.00343 
(0.00289) (0.00289) (0.00549) (0.00305) 
Married -0.00563*** -0.00562*** -0.00500* -0.00546*** 
(0.00161) (0.00162) (0.00282) (0.00188) 
Has children 0.00251 0.00260 -0.00189 0.00485** 
(0.00176) (0.00176) (0.00266) (0.00209) 
Had a job when -0.0149*** -0.0150*** 
(0.00153) (0.00151) 
High school -0.00806*** -0.00794*** -0.0129*** -0.00547** 
(0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00386) (0.00222) 
Technical education -0.00544*** -0.00541*** -0.00820*** -0.00292* 
(0.00134) (0.00133) (0.00303) (0.00171) 
No school -0.000137 4.14e-05 0.00323 -0.00233 
(0.00252) (0.00245) (0.00303) (0.00360) 
Other -0.00382 -0.00365 -0.00722** 0.00152 
(0.00264) (0.00259) (0.00362) (0.00260) 
Age at release - -0.000890*** -0.00121*** -
(5.78e-05) (5.82e-05) (0.000103) (7.47e-05) 
Theft 0.0213*** 0.0214*** 0.0234*** 0.0203*** 
(0.00212) (0.00213) (0.00305) (0.00232) 
Drugs -0.00207 -0.00196 -0.00212 -0.000975 
(0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00299) (0.00156) 
DUI 0.00543*** 0.00547*** 0.00820** 0.00410*** 
(0.00149) (0.00148) (0.00325) (0.00156) 
Assault 0.00746*** 0.00756*** 0.0118*** 0.00488*** 
(0.00151) (0.00150) (0.00245) (0.00171) 
Sentence 4.68e-06** 4.66e-06** -1.56e-06 7.67e-06*** 
(1.99e-06) (1.99e-06) (3.24e-06) (2.22e-06) 
Constant 0.0853*** 0.0631*** 0.0903*** 0.104*** 0.0633*** 
(0.00425) (0.00303) (0.00447) (0.00901) (0.00561) 
Observations 123,421 127,810 123,421 48,174 75,247 
R-squared 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.017 0.010 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies. Standard errors are clustered at county level * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***  p<0.001 
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Table 5: Robustness checks. We vary measures of jobs announcements, as well as spatio-temporal controls.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
all 
announcement 
announcements 
within 15 days 
announcements 
within 60 days 
Week and 
county FE Month*county FE 
Day*county 
trend 
Day*county trend 
with county FE 
Positive announcements, -0.00137*** -0.00178*** -0.00128*** -0.00146*** 
30 days (0.000200) (0.000229) (0.000168) (0.000192) 
Negative announcements, 0.000908*** 0.00142*** 0.00128*** 0.00101*** 
30 days (0.000304) (0.000424) (0.000279) (0.000304) 
Positive announcements -0.00130*** 
with public sector, 30 days (0.000212) 
Negative announcements 0.000912*** 
with public sector, 30 days (0.000310) 
Positive announcements,  -0.00162*** 
15 days (0.000299) 
Negative announcements, 0.00137*** 
15 days (0.000398) 
Positive announcements, -0.000970*** 
60 days (0.000106) 
Negative announcements, 0.000930*** 
60 days (0.000243) 
Constant 0.0901*** 0.0878*** 0.0910*** 0.0770*** 0.0814*** 0.0956*** 0.0972*** 
(0.00451) (0.00436) (0.00475) (0.00319) (0.00392) (0.00387) (0.00336) 
Observations 123,421 123,421 123,421 123,421 123,421 123,421 123,421 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.023 0.013 0.015 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***  p<0.001 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies, as well as controls for gender, marital status, education, offense, age at release, sentence length, type of prison, and 
dummies for being French, being born in France, having children, having a job when incarcerated. Standard errors are clustered at county level 
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Table 6: Robustness checks: recidivism by parole status 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Number of 
suspended sentences Recidivism: no parole Recidivism: parole 
        
Positive announcements, 30 days 0.000272 -0.00133*** -0.00135*** 
(0.000223) (0.000211) (0.000501) 
Negative announcements, 30 days 0.000372 0.000898*** 0.00124 
(0.000352) (0.000317) (0.000820) 
Constant 0.0687*** 0.0916*** 0.0531*** 
(0.00373) (0.00474) (0.0167) 
Observations 127,810 114,365 9,056 
R-squared 0.015 0.014 0.029 
 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies, as well as controls for gender, marital status, education, 
offense, age at release, sentence length, type of prison, and dummies for being French, being born in France, 
having children, having a job when incarcerated. Standard errors are clustered at county level 
 
 
Table 7: Heterogeneity, recidivism by type of offense. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
recidivism for 
property 
offenses 
recidivism for 
drugs 
recidivism for 
DUI 
recidivism for 
violence 
          
Positive announcements, 30 days -0.000775*** -0.000337*** -0.000405*** -0.000431*** 
(0.000155) (6.03e-05) (0.000124) (9.90e-05) 
Negative announcements, 30 days 0.000400 -7.66e-05 0.000108 0.000365** 
(0.000255) (0.000101) (0.000140) (0.000178) 
Constant 0.0496*** 0.0194*** 0.0177*** 0.0362*** 
(0.00284) (0.00208) (0.00220) (0.00283) 
Observations 123,421 123,421 123,421 123,421 
R-squared 0.022 0.010 0.011 0.011 
 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies, as well as controls for gender, marital status, education, 
offense, age at release, sentence length, type of prison, and dummies for being French, being born in France, 
having children, having a job when incarcerated. Standard errors are clustered at county level 
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Table 8: Effect of job announcement depending on announcement and job timing 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
News in the month after release about jobs opened before release -2.55e-06 4.12e-05 
(0.000634) (0.000629) 
News in the month after release on jobs opened after release -0.00151*** -0.00155*** -0.00151*** 
(0.000272) (0.000315) (0.000309) 
News in the month before release on jobs opened after release -0.000525 -0.000526 
(0.000367) (0.000368) 
Constant 0.0869*** 0.0864*** 0.0868*** 
(0.00501) (0.00501) (0.00501) 
Observations 123,421 123,421 123,421 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies, as well as controls for gender, marital status, education, 
offense, age at release, sentence length, type of prison, and dummies for being French, being born in France, 
having children, having a job when incarcerated. Standard errors are clustered at county level 
 
 
Table 9: Job announcements and recidivism, control for official statistics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of 
vacancies : 
VARIABLES 
Number 
vacancies V/U ratio 
Long term V / U 
ratio released first week 
          
Positive announcements no public sector, 30 days -0.00128*** -0.00134*** -0.00137*** -0.00130*** 
(0.000184) (0.000203) (0.000204) (0.000359) 
Negative announcements no public sector, 30 days 0.000891*** 0.000905*** 0.000905*** 0.00173*** 
(0.000300) (0.000296) (0.000292) (0.000607) 
number of job vacancies (official stats) -0.00187** -0.000164 
(0.000721) (0.00143) 
vacancies / number unemployed -0.00871 
(0.0419) 
long term vacancies / number unemployed 0.336* 
(0.182) 
Constant 0.0987*** 0.0914*** 0.0820*** 0.0753*** 
(0.00582) (0.00528) (0.00645) (0.00963) 
Observations 123,421 123,421 123,421 27,725 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.018 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies, as well as controls for gender, marital status, education, 
offense, age at release, sentence length, type of prison, and dummies for being French, being born in France, 
having children, having a job when incarcerated. Standard errors are clustered at county level 
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Table 10: Recidivism after 6 months, by quality of Internet coverage.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Bad: >15 Internet-
less zones 
Medium:10 - 15 Internet-
less zones 
Good: <10 Internet-less 
zones 
        
Positive announcements, 30 days -0.00102*** -0.00120*** -0.00171*** 
(0.000143) (0.000421) (0.000276) 
Negative announcements, 30 days 0.000222 0.00111 0.00137*** 
(0.000509) (0.000663) (0.000452) 
Constant 0.0983*** 0.0843*** 0.0896*** 
(0.00897) (0.00924) (0.00655) 
Observations 35,940 39,551 47,930 
R-squared 0.014 0.015 0.014 
 
Note: Regressions include month and county dummies, as well as controls for gender, marital status, education, 
offense, age at release, sentence length, type of prison, and dummies for being French, being born in France, 
having children, having a job when incarcerated. Standard errors are clustered at county level 
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